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Heaps and Chains: Is the Chaining
Argument for Parity a Sorites?*
Luke Elson
I argue that the Ruth Chang’s Chaining Argument for her parity view of value
incomparability trades illicitly on the vagueness of the predicate ‘is comparable
with’. Chang is alert to this danger and argues that the predicate is not vague,
but this defense does not succeed. The Chaining Argument also faces a dilemma.
The predicate is either vague or precise. If it is vague, then the argument is most
plausibly a sorites. If it is precise, then the argument is either question begging or
dialectically ineffective. I argue that no chaining-type argument can succeed.
Ruth Chang defends the strikingly original claim that there is a fourth
value relation of parity, instantiated in some cases of value incompara-
bility ðalso called ‘incommensurability’Þ. The parity view is that in at least
some evaluative comparisons between two options, neither is better than
the other, and they are not equally good, but the options are never-
theless comparable: they are on a par. Parity is a fourth comparative
relation, besides the ‘trichotomous’ three of betterness, worseness, and
equality.
A central argument for this view is the Chaining Argument.1 But,
I argue, it has not been noticed that the Chaining Argument illicitly
trades on the vagueness of its key predicate, namely, ‘is comparable
with’. Chang is alert to the danger of vagueness, but her defense against
it applies to only one of the two ways vagueness could undermine the
argument, and there is no clear way to generalize this defense.
* I am indebted to Ruth Chang, Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Keith Simmons, and three
anonymous reviewers for this journal, for extensive discussion and comments.
1. Ruth Chang, “The Possibility of Parity,” Ethics 112 ð2002Þ: 659–88, esp. sec. 2. Chang
has also defended parity elsewhere. For discussion, see, e.g., Joshua Gert, “Value and
Parity,” Ethics 114 ð2004Þ: 492–510; and Ryan Wasserman, “Indeterminacy, Ignorance and
the Possibility of Parity,” Philosophical Perspectives 18 ð2004Þ: 391–403.
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In Section I, I sketch the terrain. In Section II, I describe the
Chaining Argument. Section III shows how the Chaining Argument is
structurally similar to a sorites fallacy and describes Chang’s defense
against this. Section IV shows that this defense is ineffective against an-
other overlooked way in which the Chaining Argument could be a sorites.
In Section V, I argue that this possibility explains the intuitive plausibility
of the argument’s central premise. In Section VI, I argue that Chang’s
defense cannot be extended to cover this possibility without question
begging. Section VII concludes with an argument that no chaining-type
argument is likely to be effective in defense of parity.
I. THE TERRAIN
In this dialectic, we are concerned with cases of trichotomous incom-
parability:
Trichotomous Incomparability. Two objects A and B are trichoto-
mously incomparable just in case it is not true that A is better than B,
not true that B is better than A, and not true that A and B are
equally good.
This definition of trichotomous incomparability rules out ‘epistemic’
views, according to which, relative to a given comparison, it is always the
case that one option is better or they are equally good, although we are
frequently ignorant of which. Chang argues convincingly against such
views.2
Let’s follow Chang in two ways. First, ‘good’ and ‘better’ are often
placeholders for some more specific evaluative term. We will be espe-
cially concerned with the evaluative predicate ‘creative’ and its compar-
atives. Second, we use the names ‘Mozart’ and ‘Michelangelo’ somewhat
stipulatively: ðiÞ they are trichotomously incomparable, with respect to
creativity; and ðiiÞ they are the most favorable case for the parity view—if
parity exists, then Mozart and Michelangelo are creatively on a par.
Following John Broome, such cases of incomparability are usefully
represented as a standard configuration.3 Figure 1 shows how we might
represent the comparison of various sculptors to Mozart, with respect to
artistic creativity. Here Mozart is the ‘standard’ in question, against which
the sculptors will be compared. The arrow indicates sculptors of increas-
ing creativity; the dashed lines indicate that the nature of the zonal
boundaries is unspecified. For clarity, I have included a region of ðperhaps
2. See the discussion at Chang, “The Possibility of Parity,” 668ff., and the works cited
there.
3. John Broome, “Is Incommensurability Vagueness?” in Incommensurability, Incompa-
rability, and Practical Reason, ed. Ruth Chang ðCambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1997Þ, 67–89.
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merely possibleÞ sculptors who are more creative than Mozart. Finally, the
precise relative positions of Mozart and Michelangelo should be ignored;
they are artifacts of diagramming.
The question at hand is, what’s going on in the zone of trichoto-
mous incomparability? It is natural to think that if A and B are trichot-
omously incomparable, then they are incomparable full stop:
Hard Incomparabilism. In cases of trichotomous incomparability,
it is false that A is better than B and false that B is better than A
and false that A and B are equally good. In virtue of this, A and B
are not evaluatively comparable.4
To say that A and B are evaluatively comparable is to say that there is a
true comparison that holds between them.5 If Hard Incomparabilism is
right, then Mozart and Michelangelo are trichotomously incomparable
and incomparable full stop ðsee fig. 2Þ. After all, what other comparison
could hold? This intuition is what grounds the Trichotomy Thesis:
Trichotomy Thesis. “½If  two items A and B are evaluatively compa-
rable, then A must be better or worse than B, or A and B must be
equally good.”6
If the Trichotomy Thesis is right, then the only such relations are the
classic three. Chang denies this trichotomous orthodoxy:
4. For a classic presentation, see Joseph Raz, “Value Incommensurability: Some Pre-
liminaries,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, n.s., 86 ð1985–86Þ: 117–34.
5. In particular, ‘comparable’ does not mean more or less equal, as sometimes in ev-
eryday use.
6. Chang, “The Possibility of Parity,” 660.
FIG. 1.—Standard configuration with trichotomous incomparability
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Parity View. There are some cases of trichotomous incomparability
which are nevertheless cases of evaluative comparability. In these
cases, the trichotomous relations determinately do not hold, and
the fourth relation of parity determinately holds.
On this view, parity is not derivative or otherwise second class. It is as
respectable as betterness, worseness, and equality. So even though Mo-
zart and Michelangelo are trichotomously incomparable, they are com-
parable. There is a fourth comparative which applies. Mozart and Michel-
angelo are on a par ðsee fig. 3Þ. So the locus of disagreement betweenHard
Incomparabilism and parity amounts to this: Is there such a Mozart and
Michelangelo, comparable yet not trichotomously comparable? Hard In-
comparabilism stands or falls with the Trichotomy Thesis. Trichotomy is
true just in case there is no such pair, and in that case Hard Incompara-
bilism is the right view.
Ruth Chang offers an existence proof for parity and thus an argu-
ment that Trichotomy is false; in terms of our stipulations, she gives an
argument that Mozart and Michelangelo are on a par. This is the Chain-
ing Argument, and it is the topic of this article.
II. THE CHAINING ARGUMENT
The Chaining Argument has two uncontroversial premises and two cru-
cial and nonobvious premises. The first uncontroversial premise follows
from our stipulations:
ðCA1Þ Mozart and Michelangelo are trichotomously incompara-
ble: it’s not true that Mozart is more creative and not true
FIG. 2.—Hard Incomparabilism
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that Michelangelo is more creative and not true that they
are equally creative.7
The second uncontroversial premise is that Mozart is comparable with
Talentlessi, an awful sculptor—Mozart is much better.8 Let’s call Talent-
lessi S0 ðsculptor zeroÞ, and Michelangelo Sn ðsculptor nÞ for reasons
that will shortly become clear. Then:
ðCA2Þ Mozart is comparable with S0.
The nonobvious premises are the Existence Claim and the Small Unidi-
mensional Difference Principle.
The Existence Claim is that Talentlessi is connected to Michel-
angelo via a series of “small unidimensional differences.”9 By repeatedly
improving Talentlessi in single small ways, we could make him as creative
as Michelangelo. Put another way, there exists a chain of ðin most casesÞ
merely possible sculptors S0 ðTalentlessiÞ, S1 ða sculptor slightly more
creative in one respect than S0Þ, S2, . . . , Sn ðMichelangeloÞ such that
between any two adjacent members of the chain there is only a small
unidimensional quality difference. Let’s extend our numbering in the
obvious way:
ðCA3Þ Existence Claim. The chain S0, S1, . . . , Sn exists, and
between any two adjacent members there is just a small
unidimensional difference.
FIG. 3.—Parity
7. Remember that we are ruling out epistemicism and using these names somewhat
stipulatively.
8. See Chang, “The Possibility of Parity,” 672 n. 18.
9. Ibid., 673–74.
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This premise could be denied, but it is not our focus here. For our
purposes, the next premise is crucial. This is the Small Unidimensional
Difference Principle, which has it that these small unidimensional dif-
ferences preserve comparability, at least in this most favorable case:
“between two evaluatively very different items, a small unidimensional
difference cannot trigger incomparability where before there was com-
parability. In other words, for items that bear very different respects of
the covering consideration, incomparability between them cannot be a
matter of some small difference in one of the respects borne such that
without this small difference the items would be comparable.”10 In this
case, the Difference Principle claims that if Mozart is comparable with
one member of the chain, then he is comparable with adjacent members
of the chain:
ðCA4Þ Small Unidimensional Difference Principle. If Mozart is
comparable with some Sk in the chain, then if there are
Sðk 2 1Þ and Sðk 1 1Þ in the chain, then Mozart is compa-
rable with Sðk 2 1Þ and Sðk 1 1Þ.
We are ready to state the rest of the Chaining Argument:
ðCA5Þ Mozart is comparable with Sn ðMichelangeloÞ. ðCA2, CA3,
CA4, and n applications of modus ponens.Þ
ðCA6Þ Mozart is comparable but not trichotomously comparable
with Michelangelo. ðCA5 and CA1.Þ
ðCA7Þ So the Trichotomy Thesis and Hard Incomparabilism are
false, and a fourth comparison—stipulatively named ‘par-
ity’—holds between Mozart and Michelangelo. ðCA6.Þ
The structure of this argument is clear. Since Mozart is comparable with
Talentlessi, and there exists a chain of the right sort from Talentlessi to
Michelangelo, we may repeatedly apply the Difference Principle and
show that Mozart is comparable with Michelangelo. But none of the orig-
inal three comparative relations applies, so Mozart and Michelangelo are
comparable in some fourth way—parity. If this argument is sound, then
Hard Incomparabilism, which denies that Mozart and Michelangelo are
comparable, is false.
III. IS THE CHAINING ARGUMENT A SORITES?
The Chaining Argument resembles ‘classic’ cases of sorites reasoning:
ðR1Þ Someone with £1 is not rich. ðPremise.Þ
ðR2Þ If someone with £k is not rich, then someone with £ðk1 1Þ is
not rich. ðPremise.Þ
10. Ibid., 674.
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ðR3Þ So, someone with a million pounds is not rich. ðR1, R2,
999,999 instances of modus ponens.Þ
Call this the ‘rich man argument’. It is not a sound argument for its
conclusion but is a sorites fallacy. Given this structural similarity, we
should worry that the Chaining Argument is also a sorites.
Chang rightly notes that not all arguments with the form of a sorites
are sorites. Mathematical induction is valid ðone hopesÞ, but it has a
similar form to the sorites. So is the Chaining Argument more like the
rich man or more like mathematical induction, in the relevant respects?
The structural similarity between the cases introduces a burden that
must be discharged: Why should we not think that the Chaining Argu-
ment is a sorites?11
Sorites fallacies turn on the vagueness of the predicates involved.
In particular, it is the vagueness in ‘is rich’ that renders the rich man
argument fallacious and a lack of corresponding vagueness that renders
mathematical induction respectable. So showing that there is no vague-
ness present is an effective means of discharging this burden.
Chang adopts this strategy to mitigate the worry that the arguments
for parity “look suspiciously like sorites arguments.” In particular, she
argues that “if ½the arguments did turn on the vagueness of these com-
paratives, the cases at issue ½i.e., cases of trichotomous incomparability
would not be examples of some fourth value relation but rather border-
line cases of one of the traditional trichotomy of relations.”12 Chang of-
fers several ‘direct’ arguments that trichotomous incomparability is not
borderlineness, and so the consequent of this implication is false. She
rejects the semantic indeterminist view of incomparability:
Semantic Indeterminism. It is determinate that either Mozart is
better than Michelangelo or that Michelangelo is better than Mo-
zart or that they are equally good. However, it is indeterminate
which comparison applies.13
On the semantic indeterminist view, ‘Michelangelo is incomparable
with Mozart’ is true just in case it is indeterminate which of the com-
parisons better/worse/equality applies between Michelangelo and Mo-
zart. Depending on one’s account of indeterminacy, it may be deter-
11. I’m grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out several infelicities and
unclarities in this part of an earlier version of the article.
12. Chang, “The Possibility of Parity,” 665.
13. A neat defense of this view ðbut which I think ultimately failsÞ is Broome, “Is In-
commensurability Vagueness?” I criticize Broome’s argument in my “Borderline Cases and
theCollapsingPrinciple,”Utilitas ðforthcomingÞ, doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S095382081
300023X. I defend a version of the view in my “Incommensurability as Comparative Border-
lineness” ðunpublished manuscript, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 2013Þ.
Elson Heaps and Chains 563
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minate that one of them applies but indeterminate which. To say that
they are incomparable is to make a metalinguistic claim:14 that Michel-
angelo is a borderline case of the comparative predicate ‘is more cre-
ative than Mozart’.15
This indeterminacy might be grounded in indeterminacy in how
the features relevant to ‘is more creative’ are to be weighed: on some
acceptable weightings, Mozart is better; on some, Michelangelo is better;
perhaps on a few, Mozart and Michelangelo are equally good. Then it
will be indeterminate which of the comparisons applies ðsee fig. 4Þ.16 As I
mentioned, Chang offers several arguments against Semantic Indeter-
minism.17 The claim is that if we can show that Semantic Indeterminism
is false, then the predicates in question are not vague in a way that would
undermine the Chaining Argument.
So Chang offers a three-stage response to the worry that the
Chaining Argument might turn on vagueness: ð1Þ if the argument is a
sorites, then the predicate involved is vague; ð2Þ if the predicate involved
is vague, then Semantic Indeterminism is true; and ð3Þ the direct argu-
ments refute Semantic Indeterminism. Item 1 is unproblematic, and we
may accept 3 for the sake of argument. But in the next section, we’ll see
that 2 is false: Semantic Indeterminism is not the only way that ‘is com-
parable with Mozart’ could be vague.
IV. FUZZY HARD INCOMPARABILISM
Let’s look again at Hard Incomparabilism, which has it that Michel-
angelo occupies a zone of determinate incomparability with Mozart.
That view does not specify the nature of the boundaries of that zone.
In particular, that zone could have vague boundaries. Such a view would
also posit vagueness, but it would be quite distinct from Semantic In-
determinism:
Fuzzy Hard Incomparabilism. Hard Incomparabilism is correct.
There are some sculptors who are determinately incomparable with
Mozart and some who are determinately comparable with Mozart.
14. Or an epistemic one, or a metaphysical one, depending on one’s view of vagueness.
15. And, depending on the case, of its ‘less creative’ and ‘equally creative’ counterparts.
16. Remember that we are setting aside epistemicism as an account of trichotomous
incomparability. Note that one could combine Semantic Indeterminism with an episte-
micist view of vagueness; I would also count this as a form of Semantic Indeterminism,
albeit a terminologically odd one. The core claim of Semantic Indeterminism is that
incomparability is borderlineness; this is compatible with an ignorance analysis of bor-
derline cases of vague predicates.
17. Chang, “The Possibility of Parity,” 682ff. These arguments are incisive and are
among the central challenges to my own semantic indeterminist view. I respond to them in
my “Incommensurability as Comparative Borderlineness.”
564 Ethics April 2014
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But the boundary between the comparable and the incomparable is
vague. Some sculptors lie on the vague border between being in-
comparable with Mozart and worse than Mozart. They are border-
line comparable with Mozart.18
On this view, there is no determinate number of distinct small unidi-
mensional improvements required before the improved sculptor is in-
comparable with Mozart ðsee fig. 5Þ. The answer to that question is
vague, just like the answer to the question ‘how many pounds does a
pauper need to become rich?’ is ðsee fig. 6Þ. But just as this is compatible
with there being many amounts of money n such that having £n does
make one determinately rich, so there are many sculptors at the ‘upper
end of the chain’ such that having been improvedn times does make Sn
determinately incomparable with Mozart.19 This shows that 2 is false:
even though this view is not Semantic Indeterminism, the crucial pred-
icate ‘is comparable with Mozart’ is vague.
Even if Chang’s direct arguments are effective against Semantic
Indeterminism, they do nothing to rule out this view. The target of those
arguments is the possibility in which cases of trichotomous incompara-
FIG. 4.—Semantic Indeterminism
18. As two anonymous referees have rightly pointed out to me, it is slightly tenden-
tious to claim that if the boundary is vague, then there are borderline cases. Such talk adds
clarity but should officially be interpreted in terms of a vague boundary. My argument
does not rely on borderline cases: it is not borderline cases but tolerance ðdiscussed belowÞ
that brings the possibility of sorites fallacy. As an autobiographical note, I suspect that
borderlineness is central to vagueness, but that is admittedly controversial.
19. It might be worried that the two cases are somewhat disanalogous because ‘is rich’
is monadic, whereas ‘is comparable with’ is relational. But this is not a problem: the predi-
cate in the Chaining Argument is ‘is comparable with Mozart ’, which is monadic.
Elson Heaps and Chains 565
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bility “would not be examples of some fourth value relation but rather
borderline cases of one of the traditional trichotomy of relations.”20 In
other words, the arguments are against the claim that cases of trichot-
omous incomparability are borderline applications of a vague predicate
ðor severalÞ. They aim to show that there are significant differences
between cases of incomparability like that of Mozart and Michelangelo
with respect to creativity and vague-borderline cases like those of ‘is
balder than’. But Fuzzy Hard Incomparabilism does not claim that cases
of incomparability are borderline cases; its central claims are that cases
of incomparability are those in which the three trichotomous compar-
isons betterness/worseness/equality determinately fail to apply and that
‘is incomparable with Mozart’ has vague boundaries.
In slogan form: Semantic Indeterminism is the claim that incom-
parability is a phenomenon of vagueness—to be incomparable with Mozart
is to be a borderline case of the three trichotomous comparisons. Fuzzy
Hard Incomparabilism denies this. On this view, to be incomparable
with Mozart is for each of these comparisons to be false. But the predi-
cate ‘is incomparable with Mozart’ has vague boundaries, just as ‘is a
heap’ and ‘is tall’ do. Since this view is inconsistent with Semantic In-
determinism, arguments against the semantic account—such as Chang’s
direct arguments—do not undermine Fuzzy Hard Incomparabilism.
Now, we can see how Fuzzy Hard Incomparabilism would render
the Chaining Argument a sorites. The point here is twofold. First, it is
admitted by all that the Chaining Argument is structurally similar to a
sorites and that this introduces a burden of showing that it is not a
fallacy. This was to be met by showing that the predicate in question is
20. Chang, “The Possibility of Parity,” 665.
FIG. 5.—Fuzzy Hard Incomparabilism ðwavy lines indicate vaguenessÞ
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not vague, but that standard has not been met: vagueness has not been
ruled out.
But I also wish to make a stronger claim. The vagueness in Fuzzy
Hard Incomparabilism means that the Chaining Argument is relevantly
similar to that which grounds other sorites paradoxes. Sorites fallacies
typically trade on the sort of vague boundaries that Fuzzy Hard Incom-
parabilism posits. As we have seen, the rich man argument illicitly trades
on the vagueness of the predicate involved ð‘is rich’Þ. Consider other
classic sorites arguments, such as those involving ‘is tall’, ‘is a heap’, or ‘is
bald’, for example. Each of these is grounded in the fact that the pred-
icate involved has vague boundaries, which is what Fuzzy Hard Incom-
parabilism claims for ‘is comparable with Mozart’.
Let’s focus on the rich man. In response to worries that this argu-
ment is a sorites fallacy, we might ðcorrectlyÞ claim that these worries
could be dispelled by showing that ‘is rich’ is not vague. But to carry this
plan out, it would not do merely to show that a semantic indeterminist
account of richness ðaccording to which to be rich is to be a borderline
case of some other predicateÞ is false. We would need to show is that ‘is
rich’ does not have vague boundaries. It is the analogue of this latter
claim which would undermine Fuzzy Hard Incomparabilism and which
Chang’s direct arguments do not establish.
The point is not just that there are two ways that ‘is comparable
with’ could be vague—Semantic Indeterminism and Fuzzy Hard In-
comparabilism—and that Chang’s direct arguments rule out only one of
them. The kind of vagueness which is not ruled out ðthat which is char-
acteristic of Fuzzy Hard IncomparabilismÞ grounds the most common
instances of the sorites paradox, including the original: ‘is a heap’ has
vague boundaries, but to be a heap is not to be a borderline case of
some other predicate. The direct arguments not only fail to rule out
half of the sources of vagueness; they fail to rule out the more threaten-
ing half. In the next section, I present another reason to think the Chain-
ing Argument is a sorites—seeing it as a sorites explains the undeniable
plausibility of its key premise.
FIG. 6.—Vague boundary of ‘is rich’ ðwavy line indicates vaguenessÞ
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V. AN ERROR THEORY FOR THE DIFFERENCE PRINCIPLE
Fuzzy Hard Incomparabilism can also explain the plausibility of the Dif-
ference Principle. Here are some quotes from Chang’s defense of that
principle:
Now we bring to bear a key intuition . . . between two evaluatively very
different items, a small unidimensional difference cannot trigger in-
comparability where before there was comparability . . . a small uni-
dimensional difference just does not seem powerful enough to effect
a switch from two such items being comparable to their being in-
comparable.21
The Small Unidimensional Difference Principle has deep intuitive
appeal. It is just plain hard to believe of two evaluatively very dif-
ferent but by hypothesis comparable items that making a small uni-
dimensional improvement or detraction in one of them can thereby
effect a switch from the items’ being comparable to their being in-
comparable.22
How can changing one of the careers ever so slightly in a single
respect change the relation between the careers such that before
there was an evaluative difference and now there is none—not
even a zero difference?23
This consideration is by no means decisive, but this is noticeably similar
to how one might motivate tolerance principles in the case of vague pred-
icates: How could adding just £1 make a nonrich man rich? It’s just hard
to believe; the addition of just £1 doesn’t seem powerful enough to effect
such a change. Chang is correct that the Difference Principle has ‘deep
intuitive appeal’, but if there is a boundary between the comparable and
the incomparable zones ði.e., if some version of Hard Incomparabilism is
rightÞ, then the Difference Principle can be read as a statement that this
boundary has vagueness.
I think that the best diagnosis of the principle’s intuitive appeal is
that it is a tolerance principle for a vague predicate. As Crispin Wright has
argued, tolerance ð“a notion of a degree of change too small to make
any difference, as it were”Þ is a key characteristic of vague predicates
that are vulnerable to the sorites paradox.24 One millimeter couldn’t
make a short man not short, one hair couldn’t make a bald child not
21. Ibid., 674.
22. Ibid., 675.
23. Ibid., 676.
24. Crispin Wright, “On the Coherence of Vague Predicates,” Synthese 30 ð1975Þ: 325–
65, quote on 333.
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bald, and so on. In the same way as the vagueness of ‘rich’ can make ‘if a
man with £n is rich, then a man with £ðn 1 1Þ is rich’ intuitively com-
pelling, so the vagueness of ‘comparable’ on Fuzzy Hard Incompara-
bilism would be expected to make ‘if Sn is comparable with Mozart, then
Sðn 1 1Þ is comparable with Mozart’ compelling.
The key point is that the principle would appear to be correct,
even if it were just an artifact of the vague boundary of ‘is comparable
with Mozart’. If Fuzzy Hard Incomparabilism were correct, we would
expect a tolerance principle identical to the Difference Principle to be
intuitively overwhelming. The Difference Principle is intuitively plausi-
ble. But this intuitive plausibility adds to the suspicion that ‘is compa-
rable with Mozart’ might have vague boundaries and that Fuzzy Hard
Incomparabilism might be correct.
VI. CAN CHANG’S STRATEGY BE GENERALIZED?
We’ve seen that the possibility of Fuzzy Hard Incomparabilism is one
way that the Chaining Argument could trade on the vagueness of ‘is
comparable with Mozart’, that this could explain the plausibility of the
Difference Principle, and that arguments against Semantic Indeter-
minism are ineffective against this. But what about an adaptation of
Chang’s strategy—showing that ‘is comparable with Mozart’ also lacks
this sort of vagueness? This would be to acknowledge that there is a
burden of showing that ‘is comparable with Mozart’ does not have vague
boundaries and to try to meet it. This is not promising. It would be to
show that the Hard Incomparabilism in question is not fuzzy, but sharp:
Sharp Hard Incomparabilism. Hard Incomparabilism is correct.
Michelangelo is incomparable with Mozart. Every object is either
determinately comparable with Mozart or determinately incompa-
rable withMozart. There are no ‘borderline-comparable’ objects. The
predicate ‘is comparable with Mozart’ does not have vague bound-
aries.
On this view, there would be some number k of small unidimensional
improvements to Talentlessi, such that a sculptor with k improvements
is worse than—and therefore comparable with—Mozart, but a sculptor
with ðk 1 1Þ is not better than, worse than, or as good as Mozart and is
therefore incomparable with him ðsee fig. 7Þ. Such a strategy could show
that the Chaining Argument is valid: the Chaining Argument is certainly
valid against Sharp Hard Incomparabilism. But this would be at the cost
of completely defanging the argument. The crucial premise of the Chain-
ing Argument is the Small Unidimensional Difference Principle, which
says that for every i, if Si is comparable with Mozart, then Sði 1 1Þ and
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Sði 2 1Þ are comparable with Mozart.25 The Difference Principle denies
that ‘is comparable with Mozart’ could be sharply bounded. But the
claim that there is such a sharp boundary is what is absolutely distinctive
of Sharp Hard Incomparabilism.
If the Difference Principle is true, then Sharp Hard Incomparabil-
ism is false. The real work of refuting Sharp Hard Incomparabilism
would be in establishing the Difference Principle. But once that had
been done, the Chaining Argument would be otiose since it would add
no additional weight to a rejection of Sharp Hard Incomparabilism.
The Chaining Argument cannot be dialectically effective against Sharp
Hard Incomparabilism since a premise of the argument—the Difference
Principle—is incompatible with that view.
VII. CONCLUSION
Hard Incomparabilism, which is the target of the Chaining Argument,
must posit either vague or sharp boundaries to the zone of incompa-
rability. If the boundaries are vague ðFuzzy Hard IncomparabilismÞ, then
the Chaining Argument has sorites structure and uses the vague predi-
cate ‘is comparable with Mozart’. If they are not vague ðSharp Hard In-
comparabilismÞ, then the Chaining Argument is not a sorites, but its
key premise—the Difference Principle—immediately falsifies the target
view, so the real work is done in defending the Difference Principle.
The apparent soundness of the Chaining Argument relies on elid-
ing the distinction between the two versions of Hard Incomparabilism.
FIG. 7.—Sharp Hard Incomparabilism ðhorizontal lines indicate lack of vaguenessÞ
25. Officially, we should add an ‘if they exist on the chain’ qualifier here, to deal with
the endpoints of the chain, if there are any.
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But once this distinction is seen, it provides a dilemma for that argu-
ment. Either it is a sorites fallacy ðor should be treated as one because
the burden of showing that it is not has not been metÞ or it contributes
nothing, dialectically, beyond the defense of the Difference Principle.
The Chaining Argument cannot fulfill its dialectical role of show-
ing that on premises that everyone should accept—Mozart-Talentlessi
comparability, the Existence Claim, the Difference Principle, and the
trichotomous incomparability of Mozart and Michelangelo—there is a
good argument for parity. The class of opponents against whom the
Chaining Argument was directed—hard incomparabilists—can neatly
explain away the apparent plausibility of its most crucial premise, the
Difference Principle.
We would accept the argument’s key premise—the Difference Prin-
ciple—only if we were already convinced of the falsity of both forms of
Hard Incomparabilism. If we were not convinced of the falsity of Fuzzy
Hard Incomparabilism, we would worry that the Difference Principle
might be an artifact of the vagueness of ‘is incomparable with Mozart’.
If we were not convinced of the falsity of Sharp Hard Incomparabilism,
we would worry that the Difference Principle is question begging. So the
Chaining Argument cannot offer any additional reasons to deny Hard
Incomparabilism.
For all that, I have not shown that parity is false or even that the
Chaining Argument is definitely an instance of the paradox of the so-
rites. To show the latter, one needs the equivalent of the claim that ‘of
course someone with £1 million is rich, so the argument must have gone
wrong somewhere’. Here that would be a claim that ‘of course Mozart and
Michelangelo are not comparable . . .’, which is obviously not available in
the current dialectic.
But I do not think the Chaining Argument can be rescued. Chang’s
paper is admirably ‘modular’: she carves up the space of views, and re-
jects each alternative, so that only parity is left standing. The Chaining
Argument’s job is to refute the Trichotomy Thesis and thereby Hard
Incomparabilism. But the current discussion shows that the Chaining
Argument cannot do this job. This job could be done by another ar-
gument, which would, together with the arguments against other views,
also provide an existence proof for parity. But it would not be the Chain-
ing Argument.
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